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The aim of this article is to introduce a treatment of the prepositions 
heading temporal adverbials as binary operators which select for certain 
aspectual properties of their arguments and order these arguments 
temporally. I extend the Dowty [19861!Taylor [1977] characterization of the 
aspectual classes to include certain basic properties of events and argue that 
a treatment of the selectional properties of temporal adverbials based on 
such a framework avoids certain incorrect predictions. I motivate this 
treatment with an analysis of until and suggest a treatment of the 
interaction of negation with adverbials. Finally I discuss how this treatment 
can be extended to other prepositions, such as for and in. 
Karttunen [1974] (following Lakoff [1969] , Lindholm [1969] , 
Hom [1971; 1972] , and others) proposes that until is ambiguous between a 
durative until and a punctual, negative-polarity item. Consider the following 
sentences from Karttunen [1974) 1 :  
( 1 )  The princess slept until the prince kissed her. 
(2) #The princess woke up until the prince kissed her. 
In ( 1 ) ,  [The princess slept] describes an eventuality2 with a certain 
duration, and combines amicably with the until phrase. In (2), [The 
princess woke up] describes a punctual eventuality, and the combination is 
infelicitous. These examples are characteristic of durative until. When (2) is 
negated, however, as in (3) , Karttunen argues that the acceptability of the 
resulting sentence is due to the presence of punctual, negative-polarity until. 
(3) The princess didn't wake up until the prince kissed her. 
Mittwoch [1977] (following Klima [1964] , Fillmore [1968] , Smith [1970] , 
Heina.m8.ki [1974] , Seuren [1974] , and others) disagrees, and instead argues 
that until is unambiguously durative. Crucially, this treatment analyzes 
negated eventualities as duratives. 
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Both treatments, however, fail to adequately characterize durativity. 
Accomplishments such as [eat a sandwich] have duration, but are 
nevertheless infelicitous with until adverbials, as in (4) : 
(4) #Joe ate a sandwich until noon. 
Also, if until selects for a punctual item when in a negative 
environment, as Karttunen claims, then a durative item is predicted to be 
incompatible with until in such an environment. The acceptability of the 
durative [Joe sleeps] in (5) shows this prediction to be incorrect . 
(5) Joe didn't sleep until midnight. 
Karttunen might avoid this problem by saying that the matrix verb phrase 
describes an inchoative (and therefore punctual) eventuality in such cases. 
Sentence (5), for example, it would be understood that Joe begins to sleep at 
midnight, interpreting [Joe sleeps] as an inchoative achievement. 
There is another problem, however. Karttunen points out that when a 
sentence with an until adverbial is negated there is a shift in what he calls 
the "focus" of the sentence. In positive sentences such as (6) , the event 
described by the matrix sentence occurs before the time indicated by the 
until phrase, but in negated sentences such as (7) the event occurs at or 
after that time. As evidence of this shift, Karttunen contrasts the 
acceptability of (6) and (7) with the phrase [at the earliest] : 
(6) She slept until noon #[at the earliest] . 
(7) She didn't wake up until noon [at the earliest] . 
Mittwoch suggests that the shift may be due to implicature, but both 
Karttunen and Mittwoch agree that these data are puzzling. 
In the following pages I will describe a characterization of the aspectual 
classes and of the selectional properties of temporal adverbials which avoids 
the above incorrect predictions. After motivating this treatment for positive 
sentences I'll propose a treatment of the interaction of negation with 
temporal adverbials to explain this "shift of focus" . 
Background 
The categorization of verbs shown below can be traced as far back as 
Aristotle, and has since been examined by Ryle [1949] , Kenny [1963] , 
Taylor [19771 and Dowty [1979; 19861 , among others. 
Statives 
know 
love 
be hungry 
Activities Accomplishments Achievements 
run draw a circle recognize 
write build a house reach the top 
sleep eat a sandwich wake up 
Vendler [1967] and Dowty [1979] give a series of tests to determine the 
category of a specific verb, including tests for the acceptability of a verb with 
certain temporal adverbials such as for and in. 
Dowty's [1986] definitions of the aspectual classes, originally from 
Taylor [1977] , are repeated below. 
• A sentence tP is stative iff it follows from the truth of tP at an interval I 
that tP is true at all subintervals of L (e.g. , if John was asleep from 1 :00 
until 2:00 PM, then he was asleep at all subintervals of this interval: be 
asleep is a stative) . 
• A sentence tP is an activity (or ener:qeia) iff it follows from the truth of 
tP at an interval I that tP is true of all subintervals of I down to a 
certain limit in size (e.g. if John walked from 1 :00 until 2:00 PM, then 
most subintervals of this time are times at which John walked; walk is 
an activity.) 
• A sentence tP is an accomplishment/achievement (or kinesis) iff it 
follows from the truth of tP at an interval I that tP is false at all 
subintervals of L (e.g. if John built a house in exactly the interval from 
September 1 until June 1 ,  then it is false that he built a house in any 
subinterval of this interval: build a house is an 
accomplishment/ achievement.) 
Treatments of the selectional properties of temporal adverbials often rely 
on definitions based on an interval semantics, such as these. I claim that 
when discussing the interaction of adverbials with aspect it is necessary to 
refer not only to the interval over which the event occurs, but also to other 
properties of the event, such as whether it culminates. I'll now construct a 
description of the aspectual classes which incorporates certain basic 
properties of events into the Dowty [1986]/ Taylor [1977] aspectual classes. 
Termination Points 
Certain past tense sentences entail that the eventuality they describe has 
ended. Aspect is an indicator of the existence of this entailment: 
Accomplishment and achievement sentences, as in (8) , have this entailment, 
and activity and stative sentences, as in (9), do not. 
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(8) Joe [ate his sandwich] this morning. 
Joe [recognized Bill] this morning. 
(9) Joe [jogged] this morning. 
Irene [was happy] this morning. 
I will say, following Kamp and Rohrer [1990] , that accomplishments and 
achievements have well-defined termination points. Conversely, activities 
and statives have poorly-defined termination points. 
We can test for the presence of a well-defined termination point by 
combining a statement which implies that a certain eventuality has 
terminated with a statement that cancels that implicature. The result is 
contradictory only when the eventuality has a well-defined termination point: 
( 10) Activity: Did Joe [jog] this morning? Yes, and he's still jogging. 
(� poorly-defined termination) 
( 1 1 )  Accomplishment: Did Joe [eat his sandwich] this morning? #Yes, 
and he's still eating his sandwich. (� well-defined termination) 
I propose that Dowty's framework be complemented by the following: 
(12) • H a sentence is an activity or a stative then it is true over an 
interval with a poorly-defined termination point . 
• H a sentence is an accomplishment/achievement then it is true over 
an interval (or "preparatory period" ) with a well-defined termination 
point. 
For example, if an accomplishment sentence P is true over an interval Ph 
then P t is an interval with a well-defined termination point and P is false at 
all subintervals of Pt. 
Temporal prepositions order their arguments 
Consider the sentences [Joe ate oysters] and [George brought out 
the sushi] . Because these sentences represent eventualities with no intrinsic 
interdependency, they can occur in either order, or they can co-occur. 
Consider their ordering in the following sentences: 
( 13 )  [Joe ate oysters] before [George brought out the sushi] . 
( 14) [Joe ate oysters] until [George brought out the sushi] . 
(15) [Joe ate oysters] after [George brought out the sushi] . 
(16) [Joe ate oysters] while [George brought out the sushi] . 
As the preposition varies, the order of the events vary. With such intuitions, 
the prepositions which head temporal adverbials can be divided, roughly, 
into the following classes: 
• Class 1. Prepositions which place A prior to B: before, until 
• Class II. Prepositions which place B prior to A: after 
• Class III. Prepositions which place A concurrently with B: while, at, 
during, for 
This tentative classification predicts that a sentence containing a temporal 
adverbial will be nonsensical if world knowledge or context forces it to take 
on an ordering of events contrary to that specified by the preposition heading 
that adverbial. Specifically, if Pi is a preposition of class i, and Ae and Be 
are the eventualities represented by phrases A and B, respectively, such that 
Ae must occur after Be, then sentences of the form [A P1 B) and [B PII A] 
are predicted to be nonsensical. These predictions are upheld in the following 
examples: 
( 17) #[Joe got into the car] before1 [he opened the car door] . 
(18) #[The bucket overflowed] until1 [Joe poured water into it] . 
(19) #[Joe opened the car door] afterIl [he got into the car] . 
Also, if A cannot co-occur with B, then sentences of the form [A PII1 B) 
are predicted to be nonsensical, as in (20) : 
(20) #[Joe called the plumber] whilem [the phone was dead] . 
The prepositions at, during, and for subcategorize for an NP 
complement rather than a sentential complement. In a sentence such as [Joe 
was home at 2PM), the classification of the preposition at requires that 
the stative described by the phrase [Joe was home] must temporally 
coincide with 2PM. Any contradiction of this coincidence is predicted be 
nonsensical, as below: 
(21) [Joe was home] at [2PM] . # . . .  He was at school all afternoon. 
(22) [Joe was home] during [Irene'S hockey practice this morning] . # . . .  He 
arrived home at noon. 
(23) [Joe was home] for [the dinner hour] .  # . . .  He arrived at home at 
midnight. 
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I'll conclude that in sentences of the form [A Pi B] , the preposition Pi 
determines the temporal order of the eventualities Ae and Be. 
If there are three ways to order eventualities, then a language only needs 
three prepositions for this purpose. Our classification of English prepositions 
lists seven of them, however, and there are many more. By way of 
explanation of this overabundance, consider the following sentences: 
(24) Joe ate his sandwich [before noon] / #[until noon] . 
(25) Irene recognized Bill [at noon] / #[during noon] . 
(26) Irene read the paper #[at her lunch hour] / [during her lunch hour] . 
These sentences are acceptable with one preposition of a class but not with 
another, suggesting the existence of a subtle difference in usage or meaning 
of the prepositions within a class3. Before discussing in detail the selectional 
properties of until and its manner of relating intervals, I will introduce the 
following terminology: 
In the DRT treatment of tense, a sentence introduces an event into the 
discourse (Hinrichs [1981] , Partee [1984] ) .  I will say that a sentence (or 
temporal phrase) A introduces into the discourse an event Ae, and that that 
event is true over the interval At as per the description of the aspectual 
classes given in (12) .  At corresponds to the notion of event time in 
Reichenbach's [1947] temporal analysis. 
I can now refine my statement of the above conclusion as follows: In a 
sentence of the form [A Pi B] , the phrases A and B introduce the events Ae 
and Be, respectively, into the discourse, and Pi orders At and Be, which are 
intervals defined as in (12) . Consider the following example: 
(27) [Joe got into the car] after [he opened the car door] . 
The A argument of after, [Joe got into the car] , introduces an 
accomplishment Ae which occurs on the interval Ah an interval with a 
well-defined termination point. The B argument, [he opened the car 
door] , introduces a Be which occurs on the interval Bt, also an interval with 
a well-defined termination point. The preposition after then orders At and 
Bt (and therefore Ae and Be) temporally. 
Until 
We are now prepared to explore in detail the selectional properties of 
until and the manner in which it orders eventualities. 
Eventualities which are true over an interval with a poorly-defined 
termination point are felicitous with until adverbials: 
(28) Activity: [Joe swam] until noon. 
(29) Stative: (Joe was hungry] until noon. 
Eventualities which are true over an interval with a well-defined termination 
point are infelicitous with until adverbials: 
(30) Accomplishment: #[Joe ate a sandwich] until noon. 
(31 ) Achievement: #(Joe recognized] Irene until noon. 
(32) Inchoative achievement:  #[Joe started swimming] until noon. 
These data lead us to conclude that, in a sentence of the form [A until B] , 
At must be an interval with a poorly-defined termination point" . Note that 
this generalization is an improvement over the statement that until selects 
for a durative eventuality in that we can now include accomplishments in the 
class of eventualities which are infelicitous with until. 
The only phrases acceptable as the prepositional object of until are 
those which introduce an eventuality true over an interval which is or 
contains a well-defined termination point: 
(33) Point in time: Joe kept working until [noon] . 
(34) Achievement: Joe kept working until [he realized it was lunchtime] . 
(35) Accomplishment: Joe was homeless until [Irene built him a house] . 
(36) Activity: #Joe watched TV until [Irene kept working] . 
Until ignores any preparatory period and selects for the well-defined point 
within Bt. To distinguish the interval Bt (the entire interval over which Be 
occurs) from that portion of Bt selected for by until, I'll refer to the 
well-defined point within Bt as Bt • •  
Until also orders its arguments. If the sentence [A until B] is true, 
then implying that Ae occurs after Bt• is nonsensical, as in (37) : 
(37) #Joe swam until noon, starting at 1 :00 PM. 
and implying that Ae occurs before Bt .. but doesn't continue to the point 
Bt .. is also nonsensical, as in (38): 
(38) Joe swam until noon. #In fact, he swam until 1 1 :30. 
We can conclude that until combines with Bt• to indicate a position in 
which to place Ae, and that that position is the interval whose final point is 
Bt .. . 
This placement of A" before Bt• will create the (defeasible) implicature 
that At does not continue beyond Bt"" i.e. , At is supplied with a well-defined 
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termination point. Because of this, until does not combine with an At which 
already has a well-defined termination point. The selectional properties of 
until can therefore be seen as a side effect of until's ordering operation. The 
final analysis is as follows: 
(39) In a sentence of the form [A until B] , until selects for a point Bt .. 
which is well-defined. Until places Ae in the interval terminating 
at Bt.. . Schematically, 
----.Ae'----�,------- · ·timeline 
Bt• 
The ellipsis in the above diagram represents a poorly-defined endpoint, and 
the round bracket indicates a well-defined endpoint. I will use a square 
bracket to indicate inclusion of an endpoint in an interval and a round 
bracket to indicate exclusion of that endpoint. 
In (40) , for example, Ae is the state of Joe being homeless, and until 
indicates that Ae occurs in the interval terminating at Bt .. , the point at 
which the house is complete. Dowty's definition of statives tells us that A is 
true at all subintervals of that interval. 
(40) Joe was homeless until Irene built him a house. 
This treatment correctly predicts that Joe is homeless while the house is 
being built and stops being homeless when the house is finished. This 
placement of Ae implies that Ae does not continue past Bt", . The 
implicature can be canceled, however, as in (41) :  
(41 ) Joe worked until noon. In fact, he worked until 1 :00. 
Sentences such as (42) appear to falsify the claim that until 
subcategorizes for an At with a poorly-defined endpoint: 
(42) Joe [drove around the block] for an hour. 
It has been noted by Moens and Steedman [1988] , however, that a verb may 
change aspectual class through a process they call coercion. The 
accomplishment in (42) has been coerced into an activity via iteration of that 
accomplishment. An activity can also be coerced into an achievement. In 
(43), for example, [he was hungry] conforms to until's requirement that Bf 
contain a well-defined termination point by taking on an inchoative 
interpretation. 
(43) Joe kept working until [he was hungry] . 
Negation 
I'll now turn to the shift of focus noted by Karttunen, and show how my 
treatment of adverbials provides an explanation for this phenomenon. 
As stated above, in a positive sentence containing an until adverbial the 
eventuality described by the matrix sentence, Ae, occurs before the time 
indicated by the until adverbial, but, in the corresponding negative sentence, 
Ae occurs at or after that time. In (44), for example, we are discussing an 
eventuality (i.e. , the holding of the hostages) which occurs before the 
kidnapper's demands are met, and in (45) we are discussing an eventuality 
(i.e. , the releasing of the hostages) which occurs after the demands are met. 
(44) The kidnapper will hold the hostages captive until his demands are 
met. 
(45) The kidnapper won't release the hostages until his demands are met. 
As evidence of this shift of focus, Karttunen points out that the phrase [at 
the earliest] is acceptable with until only when the sentence is negated: 
(46) She slept until 9 #[at the earliest] / [at the latest] . 
(47) She didn't wake up until 9 [at the earliest] / #[at the latest] . 
These data will support the notion that until aligns the eventuality 
introduced by the matrix sentence with an interval if we assume that the 
negation in (47) takes scope over the adverbial phrase (an assumption I'll 
discuss presently) .  I have argued that the preposition until combines with a 
Bt to produce an interval in which to place Ae. If negation takes scope over 
the until adverbial, it will affect the interval produced by that adverbial, 
thereby affecting the position in which until places Ae. 
How does negation affect this interval? Consider the examples below: 
(48) Joe realized the answer, but not at noon. 
(49) Joe was in his office, but not during the party. 
In (48) the realization can occur at any point other than noon. In (49) Joe 
cannot be in his office during the interval over which the party takes place, 
and the implication is that he was in his office for some period before and/or 
after the party. I'll conclude that the effect of negation on an interval is to 
complement that interval, a conclusion consistent with Keenan and Faltz's 
treatment of negation as a complementation operator [Keenan and Faltz, 
1985] . The complement of an interval will consist of all the points not 
included in that interval, schematically: 
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The interval before 2:00 
----------) ---------
2:00 
The complement of the above interval 
,------[---------, 
2:00 
When negation takes scope over until, the interval that until indicates 
in which to place Ae is complemented, and Ae is placed in this new interval 
instead. This analysis correctly predicts that the focus of the sentence will 
shift to an event occurring on this new interval. 
Consider the interpretation of sentence (50) where negation takes scope 
over the adverbial, as paraphrased in (51) .  
(50) Joe didn't sleep until midnight. 
(51) Not until midnight did Joe sleep. 
In (50),  the phrase [until midnight] indicates that the potential placement 
of Ae is the interval terminating at midnight , as shown below. 
-----------) ---------
midnight 
When negation takes scope over the until phrase this interval will be 
complemented, producing an interval whose initial point is at midnight. 
Until places Ae in this new interval, as below: 
,------[-.1oe sleeps-- · ·  
midnight 
This placement implies that Ae begins at midnight, but context may cancel 
this implicature, allowing until to place Ae later within the interval, as in 
(52) : 
(52) Joe didn't sleep until midnight. In fact, he didn't sleep until 1 :00AM. 
Recall the difference in acceptability of the phrase [at the earliest] 
with negative and positive until sentences: 
(53) She slept until 9 #[at the earliest] / [at the latest] . 
(54) She didn't wake up until 9 [at the earliest] / #[at the latest] . 
This contrast can be explained in light of my explanation of the shift of 
focus. Note that in (55a) [at the earliest] positions the initial point of Joe's 
swimming at noon, and in (55b) [at the latest] positions the final point . 
(55) Joe swam for two hours. 
a. At the earliest he was swimming at noon. 
b. At the latest he was swimming at noon. 
In (53) ,  it is the final point of Ae that is aligned with Bt"" giving that point 
some measure of salience. The phrase [at the earliest] selects for an initial 
point and is therefore infelicitous. In (54) , however, Ae has been repositioned 
so that its initial point is aligned with Bt .. .  In this case, [at the earliest] is 
acceptable. 
As for the claim that the negation in sentences such as (56) takes scope 
over the until phrase, sentence (56) cannot be paraphrased in a manner 
corresponding to the sentential scope of negation, as in (57):  
(56) Joe didn't wake up until noon. 
(57) #It is not true that Joe woke up until noon. 
Also, if we let negation take scope over the verb phrase, we should get a 
reading in which there is no event of Joe's waking up. This reading is not 
available, however. The only remaining possibility is that the negation in 
(56) takes scope over the adverbial phrase5• 
For 
This treatment can be extended to for, avoiding certain problems with 
existing treatments. Dowty [1979] gives the following truth conditions for for: 
(58) For (E P(IV/IV)/(t/i» translates into: 
�Pt�P�z[Ptn A Vt[t � n -+ AT(t , Pz)]] 
If sentence (59) is true, for example, then there is a one hour interval l over 
which [Joe jogs] is true, and at all subintervals of I [Joe jogs] is also true. 
(59) Joe jogged for an hour. 
As Dowty points out, (58) incorrectly predicts that activity sentences 
such as (59) will be ungrammatical because if an activity sentence is true 
over an interval I it is not true at all subintervals of I, but only at 
subintervals down to a certain size. Dowty also notes that habitual and 
repetitive readings are erroneously ruled out by his analysis; again, (58) 
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requires the A phrase to be true at every subinterval of Bf! disallowing gaps 
between repetitions of A • .  
Moens and Steedman [1988] alternatively propose that a for adverbial 
selects for an activity6. This analysis incorrectly rules out the acceptability 
of stative sentences such as (60). 
(60) Joe was hungry for several hours. 
In an earlier paper, they suggest that a stative may be coerced into an 
activity in order to be felicitous with a for adverbial [Moens and Steedman, 
1986] . However, if, in (60) , Joe is hungry for an interval of several hours then 
Joe is hungry at all subintervals of that interval, indicating that [Joe is 
hungry] remains a stative sentence by definition. 
An analysis of for along the lines of that proposed for until avoids these 
problems. This analysis of for requires an At of the same type as that of 
until: Eventualities which occur over an interval At with a poorly-defined 
termination point are felicitous with for. 
(61) Activity: [Irene jogged] for an hour. 
(62) Stative: [Joe was in a coma] for ten days. 
Conversely, eventualities which occur over an interval At with a 
well-defined termination point are infelicitous with for: 
(63) Accomplishment: #[Joe took off his hockey skates] for twenty 
minutes. 
(64) Achievement: #[Joe recognized George] for two hours. 
For, unlike until, selects for a Bt which is an interval rather than a 
point: 
(65) Joe managed to stay awake for [the whole meeting] . 
(66) Joe swam for [two hours] . 
(67) #Joe swam for [noon] . 
For aligns A. with Bh and A. must occupy the entire Bt interval. For 
example, the operation of for in sentence (68) is to place the eventuality of 
Joe's sleeping concurrent with the two hour interval, as shown below: 
(68) Joe slept for two hours. 
[-.Joe sleeps--] 
[-two hours-] 
Dowty's definition of activities tells us that [Joe sleeps] is true at all 
subintervals of that two hour interval down to a certain size. 
Sentence (68) implies that Joe slept for no longer than two hours, but, as 
with until, this implicature may be canceled, as in (69) .  
(69) Joe slept for two hours. In fact, he slept for three. 
As with until, when negation takes scope over the for phrase, the 
interval which for indicates in which to place Ae is complemented. Consider 
sentence (70) , below: 
(70) Joe was happy, but not for the two hours his wallet was missing. 
Complementing the two hour interval shown in (71 ) ,  we get the interval in 
which for will place [Joe is happy] , as shown in (72) :  
(71)  �-----� ---
(72) . .  ·--Joe is happy-) (--Joe is happy- . .  
A common interpretation of a negated for sentence is that there are not 
two intervals during which Ae occurs, but only the later of the two intervals. 
One interpretation of sentence (73) is that I'll be in my office two hours from 
the speech time [Reichenbach, 1947] . 
(73) I 'll be in my office, but not for two hours. 
( 74) I arrived at my office, but not for two hours. 
In (74) ,  I arrive at my office two hours after the reference time . 
. Hinrichs [1985] proposes an alternate solution to Dowty's problem. His 
truth conditions for for are based on a lattice-theoretic approach to events. 
Using an operator analogous to Carlson's [1977] realization operator, he 
breaks events into "event stages" and redefines Dowty's truth conditions for 
for and in to map these stages onto the interval specified by the for phrase. 
In this manner he allows gaps, such as those occurring in activities and 
habituals, in the eventualities selected for by for and in. 
In the treatment of prepositions I have proposed, prepositions don't refer 
to the subintervals of an interval over which a sentence is true. Instead, the 
eventuality introduced by the sentence is placed in the interval indicated by 
the adverbial. Whether the sentence is true or false at certain subintervals of 
that interval depends on Dowty's definition of the aspectual class of that 
sentence. In this manner the correct predictions concerning activities are 
made, and yet the activity retains the properties specified by its definition. 
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The correct predictions are also made concerning habitual sentences. Using 
the test given in (12) ,  we find that habitual sentences introduce eventualities 
which are true over intervals with poorly-defined termination points: 
(75) Irene [jogged] for five years. In fact, she still jogs. 
(::} poorly-defined termination) 
These sentences are correctly predicted to be acceptable with for-phrases. 
In this section, I'll briefly describe how my treatment can be extended to 
deal with in. 
In requires At to be or contain a well-defined point At. (the same 
selectional property that until has for its Bt) ,  and Bt to be a time segment 
(the same as for) . In aligns At with the last point of Bt. The initial point of 
At is constrained by speech time or by some contextually determined 
reference time. In (76),  for example, there is some ten minute period Bt 
beginning at a: contextually determined reference time, and At. is placed at 
the end of Bc, the point of realization. 
(76) Joe realized the answer in ten minutes. 
[-] � realizes 
[-ten minut,eess----I] 
The ambiguity displayed by in in sentences with future tense is explained by 
this treatment. For example, consider (77): 
(77) Joe will build a house in two months. 
This sentence has two interpretations: one in which Joe completes the 
building within a two-month period, as shown below: 
[-builds house ] 
[-two months-] 
and the inchoative interpretation in which Joe begins the building at the end 
of a 2 month period: 
[-] � begin to build 
[-two months-] 
When negation takes scope over the in adverbial, the point indicated by 
in in which to place At. is complemented. In sentence (7S) , for example, the 
point at which in wants to place the culmination of Joe's building of the 
house is the final point of Be, as shown, enclosed in brackets, in (79) . 
(7S) Joe didn't build the house in ten months. 
(79) B-----
The complement of this point is shown in (SO): 
(SO) ,-----H ---
At .. is placed somewhere in these new intervals. A paraphrase of such a 
placement is given in (SI). 
(SI) Joe didn't build the house in ten months; he built it in nine. 
Conclusions 
In summary, I have proposed a treatment of the prepositions which head 
temporal adverbials as binary operators with selectional properties based on 
an extended version of the Dowty/Taylor definitions of the aspectual classes 
and as operators which order their arguments temporally. I have shown that 
this treatment avoids problems encountered by existing treatments of 
temporal adverbials, and explains certain facts with respect to the 
interaction of negation with these adverbials. 
One issue raised by this treatment of adverbials is that of 
compositionality. If until selects for an At with a poorly-defined termination 
point and supplies it with a well-defined termination point, this new interval 
should serve as acceptable input to in adverbials, which select for an At with 
a well-defined termination point. Sentences such as (S2) are unacceptable, 
however: 
(S2) #Joe slept until noon in two hours. 
The difference between eventualities which culminate and eventualities which 
don't build to a culmination but simply terminate must be explored. How 
this difference can be formalized is a matter for future research. 
Another issue is whether achievements should be characterized as having 
an associated preparatory period. Recall that, when negation takes scope 
over an until adverbial causing a shift in focus, eventualities of all aspectual 
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classes are acceptable as Ae. The initial point of At is  placed concurrently 
with Bt .. , causing that initial point to become well-defined. I have assumed 
that it is only possible for a poorly-defined endpoint to become well-defined, 
and my treatment depends on this assumption. As a result, I can only 
explain the acceptability of achievements in these contexts by assuming that 
achievements have a preparatory period, however negligible that period is. 
That preparatory period will be an interval whose final point is the 
culmination of the achievement and whose initial point is, crucially, 
poorly-defined. 
This is not necessarily a problem, and, in fact, Dowty [1986] places 
achievements in the same class as accomplishments, which do have associated 
preparatory periods. Karttunen [1974] , Mittwoch [1977] , Moens and 
Steedman [1988] , and Vendler [1967] treat achievements as punctual, 
however, and I thought it worth mentioning that doing so will create 
complications for my treatment. 
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Footnotes 
1 I will use the symbol "#" to indicate a sentence in which the 
combination of the matrix clause and the adverbial (either in the same 
sentence or in the same context) is nonsensical or otherwise infelicitous. 
2 I will use the term eventuality (from Bach [1981] ) to refer to an element 
of the set of achievements, accomplishments, activities, and statives. 
3 In fact, it has been suggested by [Allen, 1983] , and later proven 
by [Ladkin, 1987] , that there are 13 ways for two intervals to relate 
temporally . 
.. Kamp and Rohrer [1990] propose a similar analysis for jusqu 'ti, the 
French word for until. 
5 It has been proposed ( [Jackendoff, 1972] , [Kratzer, 1989] ) that negation 
may also "focus" on a phrase within its scope, e.g. , on the subject, as in: 
i .  JOE didn't sleep until noon; IRENE did. 
or on the prepositional object of until: 
ii. Joe didn't sleep until NOON; he slept until THREE. 
I believe that treating negation as a generalized complementation operator 
(as Keenan and Faltz [1985] do) may also explain these cases; however, given 
that focus phenomena are still poorly understood (see, however, 
Rooth [1985] , Krifka [1991] ,  and Partee [1991] ) I won't discuss this issue 
further. 
6 Moens and Steedman refer to activities as processes. 
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